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MARKET  EFFICIENCY  AND  MARKETING  TO  ENHANCE  INCOME
 OF  CROP  PRODUCERS
ABSTRACT
Recent changes in farm policy have renewed interest in using marketing strategies based on
futures and options markets to enhance the income of field crop producers.  This article
reviews the literature surrounding the dominant academic theory of the behavior of futures and
options markets, the efficient market hypothesis.  The following conclusion is reached:  while
individuals can beat the market, few can consistently do so.  This conclusion is consistent with
Grossman and Stiglitz’s model of market efficiency in which individuals who consistently earn
trading returns have superior access to information or superior analytical ability.  One
implication is that, with few exceptions, the crop producers who survive will be those with the
lowest cost of production since efforts to improve revenue through better marketing will have
limited success.  There do appear to be some successful marketing strategies.  One is to base
storage decisions on when a producer harvests the crop relative to the national harvest of the
crop.  Another is to base storage decisions on whether the current basis exceeds the cost of
storage, and then to use hedging to assure an expected positive return.
MARKET  EFFICIENCY  AND  MARKETING  TO  ENHANCE 
INCOME  OF  CROP  PRODUCERS
INTRODUCTION
The use of futures and, more recently, option markets to enhance income long has
been a topic of interest to agricultural producers and others, as well as the subject of many
academic investigations (Tomek, 1987).  This topic has taken on new importance because
of recent changes in farm policy.  These changes reduce the role of government in
determining prices and incomes earned by producing the major field crops (Nelson and
Schertz, 1996).  Given this new context, we review the main concepts of the dominant
academic theory concerning the behavior of futures and options markets, the efficient
market hypothesis.  This rich conceptual base and associated empirical research has
several, important insights regarding who should be able to profit from futures and options
trading, and what strategies should be profitable.
MAJOR  CONCEPTS  OF  EFFICIENT  MARKET  HYPOTHESIS
According to Fama (1970, updated 1991) an efficient market is one that accurately
incorporates all known information in determining price1.  Fama’s original definition came
to be known as the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).  It is essentially an extension of the
zero profit equilibrium of a competitive market in a certain world to an uncertain world of
price dynamics.  Although considerable disagreement exists about the degree to which
EMH holds, it has become the dominant paradigm used by economists to understand and
investigate the behavior of financial and commodity markets2.
2The following equation allows a simple discussion of the major concepts underlying
the EMH:
(1) Pt+1  =  "  +  $Pt  +  ,t,
where Pt+1 is the price at time t + 1, Pt is the current price, " and $ are parameters, and ,t
is a random error term which is independently and identically distributed with mean 0 and
constant variance F2.  To aid in understanding EMH, equation (1) is rearranged as follows:
(2) Pt+1 - $Pt =  " +  ,t
If " = 0 and $ = 1, then
(3) Pt+1 - Pt = ,t
Last, taking the expectation of equation (3) yields:
(4) Et(Pt+1 - Pt)= 0
The price process described above is usually referred to as a random walk3 (Campbell, Lo,
and MacKinlay, 1997; Tomek and Querin, 1984).  The expected average change in price is
zero.  Furthermore, since the ,t’s are uncorrelated, changes in prices are uncorrelated.  A
commonly used analogy of a random walk is the flipping of a fair coin.
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) point out that two other versions of the
random walk hypothesis exist.  One version relaxes the assumptions on  ,t so that it is
independent but not identically distributed.  This version allows for heteroskedasticity, a
condition often found in commodity futures prices.  The second and most general version
relaxes the independence assumption, so that the ,t’s may be dependent, but uncorrelated.
It is common for individuals to visualize the random walk as a jagged line around
some initial value, with the high and low values of this line not far from the initial value. 
Stated alternatively, the random walk does not deviate much from its initial value, and
3returns to its initial value after relatively few observations (for a general discussion of this
small-number phenomenon see Tversky and Kahneman (1971)).  In contrast, a well-
accepted finding from random walk experiments is that a random walk can deviate
substantially from its initial value.  Furthermore, a large number of observations may
occur before the random walk returns to its initial value.  Thus, long periods of “trends”
and even longer periods of deviation from its initial value are consistent with a random
walk. 
A fundamental principle of modern finance is that higher risk should be
compensated with a higher return.  Furthermore, if a risk exists that can not be diversified,
an activity associated with that risk should earn a return which exceeds the risk-free rate of
return.  Thus, if buying or selling futures and/or options of a specific commodity incurs a
risk which can not be diversified, that commodity’s futures or option market could be
efficient in terms of Fama’s definition and have a price bias, i.e., Et(Pt+1 - Pt) ¹ 0,
provided the bias is a compensation for risk.  Such a price bias is commonly noted as " ¹
0, where " is the compensation for risk.
A convenient way of thinking about price bias is to use terminology introduced by
Keynes (1930).  He divided price biases into normal backwardation and contango.  In
normal backwardation, the expected price is lower than the realized price.  If this situation
exists, futures prices should increase over the course of a contract, resulting in positive
trading returns to a long position.  In a contango, the reverse is true, and the expected
price is higher than the realized price.  Hence, a short futures position will earn positive
trading returns.
4To summarize this discussion, there are two versions of Fama efficiency.  In the
first, " = 0 and $ = 1.  In the second, " ¹ 0 and $ = 1, provided a non-zero " is a
return to risk. The second situation is commonly referred to as a random walk with drift. 
Normal backwardation implies that " > 0, while contango implies that " < 0.  These
price biases may be constant over time or may vary over time.   The existence of price
biases is extremely controversial, but, whatever the investigator’s belief, their existence is
an empirical, not conceptual, question.
Violations of Fama’s Assumptions
Fama assumed no transaction costs, costless information, and that the implications
of current information for both current price and the distributions of future prices are
generally accepted by all market participants.  At least two assumptions are unrealistic. 
First, transaction costs, such as brokerage fees, exist.  The existence of transaction costs
changes the criteria by which market efficiency is evaluated:  a market is efficient if gross
trading returns do not exceed transaction costs.  Second, information is costly to acquire
and analyze.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that, if information is costly, it is impossible for
prices to perfectly reflect all available information.  Otherwise, those who use resources to
obtain information would earn no compensation to cover their costs of acquiring and
analyzing it.  This insight introduces a potential avenue for profitable trading.  Profit can
be earned by using information and analysis to take a position in anticipation of price
changes which will occur as the rest of the market learns about the information.  These
5trading returns represent a return to the costs incurred in acquiring and analyzing
information.
Grossman and Stiglitz’s model has come to be known as noisy rational
expectations4.  Relative to Fama’s model of market efficiency, it implies that $ may not
equal 1 because the market acquires and analyzes information (i.e., learns) slowly, with
traders possessing superior access to information and/or analytical ability acquiring
information first.  It also implies an alternative statement of market efficiency:  a market is
efficient with respect to the information set available at time t provided economic returns
generated by trading on this information set do not exceed transaction and information
costs (Jensen, 1978).
IMPLICATIONS  OF  MARKET  EFFICIENCY  FOR  MARKETING  STRATEGIES
For pedagogical purposes, we classify the different strategies employed in the
marketing of commodities5, including field crops, into four categories: routine strategies,
systematic strategies, strategies based on individual-generated forecasts, and strategies
based on market-generated forecasts of profits from engaging in a production activity. 
These four categories are discussed below.
Routine Strategies
A routine strategy is one that involves buying or selling at the same time during
each production cycle.  Because of their passive and unconditional nature, routine
strategies represent minimal input strategies.  These attributes make the evaluation of
routine strategies important because the routine strategy which yields the highest return
6becomes the benchmark against which active and conditional marketing strategies should
be measured.
One obvious routine strategy is to sell 100 percent of production at the end of the
production period (i.e., harvest).  Another routine strategy that has received significant
attention is to always sell a share of expected production before harvest.  Such a strategy
will enhance income if a contango exists ( " < 0 and $ = 1).  On the other hand, if the
futures or options market provides an unbiased forecast of subsequent prices (i.e., " = 0
and $ = 1), then the expected return from selling before harvest is zero.  Hence, the
success of routine selling before harvest depends on whether a routine price bias exists.
A particular type of contango price bias, known as the drought risk premium
(Wisner, 1991), has been much discussed in recent years.  This strategy is based on the
argument that, during the period before harvest, crop futures and option prices will be
priced in anticipation of a drought.  Because a drought does not normally occur, futures
prices will decline.  By extension, routinely selling a futures or option contract before
harvest should be profitable.
We examine the drought risk premium for the pre-harvest quotes of corn and
soybean new crop futures over the 1952-1996 period.  Table 1 presents the difference
between the November soybean and December corn futures quote on March 1, May 1,
July 1, and September 1 and the quote on the following November 1 or December 1. 
November 1 and December 1 represent harvest, March 1 represents pre-planting, May 1
represents planting, July 1 represents the middle of the growing season, and September 1
represents the late growing season.  A positive difference means the pre-harvest quote on
average was greater than the harvest quote, while a negative number means the pre-harvest
7quote on average was less than the harvest quote.  The differences are tested for statistical
significance at the five percent level using a two-tailed test.  Note that these comparisons
do not account for transactions costs incurred when trading6.
Over the entire 1952-1996 observation period, none of the pre-harvest quotes for
corn and soybeans differed significantly from the harvest quote.  Furthermore, none of the
eight t-statistics have a p-value which is less than 20 percent.  When the observation period
is divided in half, one t-statistic is significant at the five percent test level: soybeans, May
1, 1952-1973 (-2.59).  Over this period, November soybean futures prices increased
significantly between May 1 and November 1.  When the observation period is split into
fourths, three t-statistics are significant: corn, March 1, 1952-1962 (2.49); soybeans, May
1, 1963-1973 (-2.64); and soybeans, July 1, 1985-1996 (2.28).  Two of these significant
observations are consistent with contango, while the other is consistent with normal
backwardation.
The number of significant coefficients do not deviate by much from the laws of
chance.  For example, random chance implies that approximately 0.9 observations (16
times 0.05) over the two equally divided sub-periods should be significant at the five
percent test level.  One significant coefficient is observed.  Similar results are obtained for
the 32 cases when four sub-periods are used.  Furthermore, among the significant
coefficients, there is no consistent pattern of normal backwardation or contango.  In
summary, there is little evidence that a consistent price bias exists in pre-harvest futures
quotes.  Thus, an annual short (or long) routine hedging strategy will not enhance the price
received.
8Table 2 presents the gross trading returns from buying September and November
(December) soybean (corn) put options at the same four pre-harvest dates evaluated for
futures.  Because options expire during the month before the underlying futures contract
expires, a September put option is not available on September 1.  The put position was
closed on the 15th day of the month before the underlying futures contract expires or the
last day of trading, whichever came first.  Again, trading costs were not included in the
calculations.
The current option contracts did not begin trading until 1985 for corn and
soybeans.  Along with the 1985-1996 period, the 1990-1996 period is included because,
following Grossman and Stiglitz, markets must learn how to price new contracts.  Thus,
reasons exist for believing that any new market can generate inaccurate pricing.
Only one average gross trading return is significant at the 5 percent level: corn,
July 1, September put, 1985-1996 (2.66).  However, the comparable t-statistic for 1990-
1996 is insignificant (1.27).  In total, there is no consistent evidence of significant trading
returns to the routine buying of a put before harvest. 
An issue is whether the results for the price bias analyses translates to the farm
level decision making environment.  This issue exists because yield, as well as price,
varies at the farm level.  Hence, a marketing strategy should be evaluated in terms of its
impact on farm income.  To evaluate the transferability of price bias analyses to the farm
level, yields were collected for 21 farms operated by the University of Illinois over the
1985-1995 period.  Thursday cash prices are available for regions of the state (Good).  The
same strategies as discussed above were evaluated, but the only pre-harvest date used was
May 1.  The futures and harvest put strategies are lifted at harvest, while the September
9put strategy is closed out on the last day of trading but no later than August 15.  Harvest is
defined as the week in which 50 percent of the Illinois corn or soybean harvest was
completed.
The average gross return for all 21 farms from selling at harvest are presented in
Table 3.  Also presented is the average gross return associated with each pre-harvest
marketing strategy, as well as the average t-statistic used to test the difference between
gross returns from using the pre-harvest strategy and the gross return from selling at
harvest.  The average gross return is higher when the pre-harvest marketing strategies are
used.  However, using a five percent test level, none of the pre-harvest strategies yield a
significantly higher return than selling at harvest.  Larson, Alexander, Zulauf, and Irwin
(1997) found similar results for Ohio corn farm situations examined over the 1985-1996
period.
For comparative purposes, the per bushel gross returns generated by selling a
futures contract or buying a put option on May 1 for the 1985-1995 period are presented. 
As expected, the results for these price bias tests are similar to the results for the farm
level tests: the pre-harvest marketing strategies yield a higher return than selling at harvest,
but the return is not significantly higher.
The lack of a routine price bias in pre-harvest quotes of the corn and soybean
harvest futures and options contracts without adjusting for transaction costs is consistent
with Fama efficiency and with the view that over the preharvest period " = 0 and $ = 1. 
Thus, from the view of enhancing income, routinely selling before harvest is no better than
simply selling at harvest.  Conversely, selling at harvest is no better than selling before
harvest, if done routinely7. 
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Relative to the routine drought premium argument, our findings suggest that the
corn and soybean futures and options markets incorporate the average economic value of a
growing-season drought into their pre-harvest estimate of the harvest price.  Because a
drought usually does not happen, it is not surprising that over the 1974-1996 period corn
and soybean new crop futures declined two-thirds of the time between May 1 and
November 1 (December 1) (Figures 1 and 2).  However, the average price increase was
much greater than the average price decrease (Figures 1 and 2).  Thus, the price reaction to
a drought is much larger than the price reaction to the lack of a drought.  Putting these two
observations together results in futures and options prices being unbiased predictors {i.e.,
(average price increase times the probability that price increased) minus (average price
decrease times the probability that price decreased) is not statistically different from zero}.
Hence, while a trader can predict that corn and soybean prices will normally decline over
the growing season, this information can not be used to trade profitably unless the trader
can predict in which years price will increase (decrease).  In other words, a trader must be
able to predict a drought before it occurs.
One last point: the observed bias in futures prices varied substantially from
subperiod to subperiod.  For example, over 1974-1984 the May 1 quote of the November
soybean contract averaged 25 cents lower than the November 1 quote of the November
contract (Table 1).  In contrast, over 1985-1996, the May 1 quote averaged 40 cents higher
than the November 1 quote.  Thus, a routine sell strategy would have generated substantial
profits over 1985-1996, but substantial loses over 1974-1984.  This discussion emphasizes
the importance of having an adequate sample size before projecting past price behavior into
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the future.  It also urges extreme caution in drawing any conclusions regarding the
performance of option-based strategies, given that only 12 years of data exist.
While routine pre-harvest strategies do not appear to enhance the income of crop
farmers, other routine strategies may be profitable.  Numerous studies have investigated
whether normal backwardation or contango is a general feature of futures prices for
different commodities.  In contrast to the above analysis which focused only on the pre-
harvest period of the harvest contract, these studies have included all contracts and contract
trading periods.  The most extensive study is by Kolb (1992). He investigated the existence
of normal backwardation in daily prices of 29 futures markets from 1959 (or first year of
trading) through 1988.  For the commodities of interest in this study, he found no evidence
of normal backwardation or contango in corn, oats, or wheat futures contracts, but did find
some evidence of normal backwardation in cotton and soybeans8.  A buy-and-hold strategy
produced mean annual gross trading returns between 4.5 and 5.0 percent for cotton and
soybeans.  The returns were statistically significant at the five percent test level (Kolb, p.
81).  These findings suggest that a producer should wait to sell cotton and soybeans as long
as possible. 
Kolb’s review of the literature reveals that the existence of a routine normal
backwardation is sensitive to the time period analyzed.  Also, Kolb does not account for
the effect of overlapping sample periods or trading costs.  Both of these considerations will
reduce the confidence level associated with his results.  Nevertheless, especially in regard
to cotton and soybeans, Kolb’s findings suggest that routine strategies need further
investigation. 
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If a farmer has not already sold the crop for delivery at harvest, the farmer must
confront the issue of storage when the crop is harvested.  Many farmers routinely store,
but it is uncertain whether this makes sense given the well-known “j” shaped pattern of
cash prices over the harvest period.  Cash prices are high at the beginning of harvest, reach
a low around the middle of harvest, then begin to climb as harvest winds down.  This
pattern suggests that returns to storage may depend on the time of harvest, and, thus,
routine storage will not necessarily enhance income.
Returns to routine storage are presented in Figures 3 and 4 for corn produced in
Ohio during the 1964-1996 crop years.  Returns to storage are evaluated for the week in
which 10, 50, and 90 percent of Ohio’s corn crop is normally harvested.  The pace of the
Ohio corn harvest generally follows the national harvest rate.  Thus, the use of the Ohio
rate of harvest allows us to jointly capture the effect of the national harvest rate.  The 10,
50, and 90 percent completion rates vary by crop year, but usually fall during the first
week of October, first week of November, and last week of November.  These usual dates
are used for the analysis presented below because (1) the results are similar to those
generated using the year-specific completion dates and (2) the presentation and
interpretation of the results are simpler.
Returns, net of interest and physical storage costs, are computed for both hedged
and unhedged corn.  Transaction costs for futures trading are also subtracted when
calculating returns to hedged storage.  The storage hedge was placed in the July futures
contract9.  Because physical storage costs are included, the calculated storage returns can
be thought of as returns to (1) corn stored off the farm with storage cost being measured as
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variable costs or (2) corn stored on the farm with storage costs measured as their
opportunity cost. 
Average net return to storage, whether hedged or unhedged, are not significantly
different from zero at the five percent test level for corn harvest at the 10 and 90 percent
completion dates except for unhedged storage held one week after the 90 percent harvest
date.  Furthermore, average net returns generally were negative for hedged storage at the
10 and 90 percent completion dates and for unhedged storage at the 10 percent harvest
date.  Thus, over the analysis period, the most favorable conclusion which can be drawn is
that routine storage of corn at the 10 and 90 percent completion dates is a break-even
proposition.
Net returns to both hedged and unhedged storage are greatest for corn harvested at
the 50 percent completion date.  Net returns were positive over most storage periods,
generally falling between five and seven cents per bushel for unhedged storage and two and
four cents per bushel for hedged storage.  The lower returns for hedged storage in part
reflect its higher cost due to the transactions costs associated with futures trading.  Net
storage returns are significantly greater than zero at the five percent test level for storage
between December 1 and January 15th for unhedged storage and between December 1 and
February 15th for hedged storage.
Despite its lower average return, net returns are significant for hedged storage
because the risk associated with hedged storage returns is substantially smaller than the
risk associated with unhedged storage returns.  A common measure of this risk, standard
deviation of returns, is presented in Figures 5 and 6 for unhedged and hedged storage,
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respectively.  The difference in risk becomes more pronounced as the length of the storage
period increases.
The routine strategy which generates the highest income should be used as the
benchmark against which marketing programs are evaluated.  For producers of field crops,
the benchmark appears to be harvest-time sales for those who harvest early or late.  For
those harvesting during the middle of the harvest season, the appropriate benchmark
appears to include the return from short-to-intermediate routine storage.
Systematic Strategies
Systematic strategies base the buy/sell decision on the status of an indicator
variable.  The indicator variable can take on different values over time.  Depending on the
value of the indicator variable, the strategy may involve taking a long, short, or no
position, with the exact position changing as the value of the indicator variable changes. 
In terms of the discussion of price bias in an efficient market, these strategies are
consistent with a situation in which " can take on any value, but $ = 1, and the
relationship between " and the indicator variable is caused by a risk factor.  Thus, for
successful systematic strategies in an efficient market, the risk factor must vary over time.
A systematic strategy which has received considerable attention in the literature is
based on the argument that a hedging pressure risk premium exists.  This argument was
first stated by Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946).  It is based on the assumption that
producers engage in hedging to reduce risk.  Assuming that speculators are risk-averse,
they will assume the risk which hedgers want to transfer only if they are paid for accepting
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it.  Normal backwardation is a mechanism by which hedgers of cash commodities (i.e.,
short hedgers) pay speculators to assume the price risk avoided by hedging.  By analogy, a
contango is the mechanism by which long hedgers pay speculators to assume the price risk
avoided by hedging (Cootner, 1960).  These arguments imply that a long position will be
profitable if hedgers are net short, while a short position will be profitable if hedgers are
net long.
Bessembinder (1992) provides a recent, comprehensive analysis of this issue.  He
evaluates all contracts traded on 22 futures markets, including corn, cotton, soybeans, and
wheat, over the period January 1967 through December 1989.   He finds no relationship
for soybeans and wheat between the net short and net long position of hedgers and mean
gross trading returns.  On the other hand, a statistically significant relationship at the five
percent test level is found for corn and cotton.  For corn, net trading returns to a long
(short) position when hedgers are net short (long) for the entire month prior to taking the
position is 16 percent (20 percent) expressed on an annual basis.  For cotton, significant
returns are found only when hedgers are net short for the entire month prior to the position
being taken.  Returns to a long position are 28 percent expressed on an annual basis10.
A second systematic strategy is to condition trading positions on the state of the
economy.  In the academic literature, this is frequently referred to as a time-varying
macro-economic risk premium.  At present, the most comprehensive evaluation is by
Bessembinder and Chan (1992).  They investigated 12 futures markets over the period
January 1975 to December 1989, including cotton, soybeans, and wheat.  Returns to
trading wheat and soybean futures were not significantly related at the five percent test
level to the three macro-economic variables examined: three-month Treasury bill yield,
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dividend yield on a value-weighted equity index, and a measure of the ‘junk bond”
premium.  For cotton, the three-month Treasury bill yield was significant at the five
percent test level, as was the explanatory power of all three variables as a group.  The sign
on the Treasury bill variable was negative, implying that a reduction in Treasury bill yields
was associated with a positive return to a long position in cotton futures.  On an annual
basis, this return was approximately five percent for each unit change in Treasury bill
yield.  These results suggest that a time-varying macro-economic risk factor could exist for
cotton, and, thus, could provide a basis for a systematic hedging strategy11.
It is possible that other systematic strategies may be valid.  A number of systematic
price biases have been presented in the stock market literature.  These include, among
others, the firm size effect, the January effect, the weekend effect, and the Value-Line
effect.  For a more complete listing and discussion, see Gallinger and Poe (1995) and for a
discussion of the evidence see Ball (1996) and Fama (1991).  These systematic price biases
lead to systematic trading strategies12, such as always being long in the stock market during
January.  We would not be surprised if similar pricing biases exist in agricultural futures
market; however, as of this time there is no convincing body of evidence that systematic
biases of the kind found in the stock markets exist in the futures markets for crops.
In summary, evidence exists that for some field crop futures markets a hedging
pressure risk premium and/or a time-varying risk premium tied to macro-economic
variables may exist.  In these instances, systematic hedging strategies could be timed to
coincide with the values of these systematic risk factors.  However, the evidence is not
consistent across all field crop futures markets, implying that the usefulness of such
strategies vary by crop.
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Marketing Strategies Using Individual-Generated Forecasts
Grossman and Stiglitz’s model of market efficiency implies that positive trading
returns can be earned by those who are the first to acquire new information or who possess
superior analytical ability.  As discussed earlier, positive returns can be earned because
information is costly and because markets are human institutions and, thus, need to learn
(i.e., analyze) new information.  Hence, $ in the price bias equation may not equal 1.
Large traders, especially those involved in producing or transforming commodities,
are immersed in national and international information flows.  They also have access to
more resources than small traders.  Because of these advantages, Grossman and Stiglitz’s
model implies that large traders should make most of the money from trading on futures
and options markets.  In contrast, because of their limited ability to be among the first to
acquire new information, small traders should lose money as a group.
These implications are supported by several studies of traders’ returns.  Hartzmark
(1987) analyzed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s data on the position of
large traders in nine markets over the period 1977-1981.  Large hedgers had gross trading
profits of $728 million, large speculators made $125 million, while small traders lost $853
million (Table 4).  Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994) found that large traders in frozen pork
bellies were able to generate significant profits over the period 1982-1990, while Phillips
and Weiner (1994) found that major oil companies earned significant profits from forward
trades of Brent Blend crude oil over the 1983-1989 period.  Both of these studies attribute
the significant profits of larger traders to superior information and/or forecasting ability. 
Last, Irwin, Krukemyer, and Zulauf (1993) found that public commodity pools earned
significant gross trading returns13.  The findings of each of these studies of traders’ returns
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are inconsistent with Fama’s definition of efficiency, but are consistent with Grossman and
Stiglitz’s model of market performance14.
While the above results seem to suggest that traders with superior forecasting
ability can earn trading returns, the more pertinent question for most agricultural
producers, including crop farmers, is whether small traders can “out-forecast” the market.
Hartzmark’s (1987) analysis implies that small traders lose money as a group.  However, it
is possible that these small traders were not using the best forecasting methods.
A review of the pricing efficiency of agricultural futures markets by Garcia,
Hudson, and Waller (1988) found mixed evidence in regard to whether forecasting models
can improve upon the forecast performance of futures markets.  The percent of studies in
which forecast models performed better than futures markets varied by commodity
(inefficiency was more common in livestock than crops), by period of analysis, by forecast
horizon, and by method of analysis (inefficiency was more common with tests involving
past prices than public information).  A review of economic forecasting in agriculture by
Allen (1994, p. 105) found that econometric and other multivariate models do slightly
worse than the naïve no change forecast.  Trend extrapolation and exponential smoothing
perform the worst.  Vector autocorrelation was the best performing forecast method,
although Allen argues that it has generally been compared with relatively weak
alternatives.  In his overview of commodity futures prices as forecasts, Tomek (1997)
argues that futures markets may have low forecast ability, but model-based forecasts will
generally do no better because markets are efficient.
Irwin, Gerlow, and Liu (1994) found no significant difference between the forecast
accuracy of live hog and live cattle futures prices and U.S. Department of Agriculture
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expert predictions over the period 1980-1991.  Bessler and Brandt (1992) found that the
forecast of cattle prices by the expert they evaluated outperformed the live cattle futures
market over the period 1972-1986; however, the expert’s forecasts regarding hog prices
did not outperform the live hog futures markets.  Kastens and Schroeder (1996) found that
Kansas City wheat futures outperformed econometric forecasting over the 1947 to 1995
period.  Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin (1988) and Lukac and Brorsen (1990) found that
several technical trading systems earned significant risk-adjusted profits above transaction
costs.  However, it appear that to earn consistent profits, technical trading systems must be
used with a portfolio of markets, not just a single market.  Last, in a recent study, Conley,
Khan, and Almonte-Alvarez (1997) evaluated a two-year hedge for corn triggered by a
probability density function determination that price was in the highest 10 percent category
of historical prices over the last four years.  This strategy is a variation of technical trading
systems.  They found that, over the 1973-1995 crop years, the two-year hedge did no
better than annually selling corn at harvest.
In evaluating these mixed findings with respect to the performance of publicly
available forecasts, it is useful to keep in mind an article by Tomek and Querin (1984). 
They show through a simulation exercise that, even if prices are generated by a random
walk process, price trends (after the fact) will exist.  Therefore, it is likely that historical
analysis will discover some technical trading rule that was profitable over the period
analyzed.  The same conclusion can be reached with regard to any type of forecasting
model.  Hence, the expectation is that forecasting studies will find mixed evidence
regarding market efficiency and trading profitability.  What is more important is whether
consistent results are found repeatedly for a given forecasting model.  On this score, the
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evidence is fairly clear: no publicly available forecasting model has been found to generate
consistent trading profits when applied to a single market.
Another area of investigation recently has emerged that falls somewhere between
the large trader return studies and the public price forecasting studies.  This area focuses
on evaluating the performance of advisory services who provide marketing assistance to
farmers.  Because of their on-going collection and evaluation of information, it is possible
that these services may be able to enhance farmer income.  The available studies have
focused on corn and soybeans.  They include Gehrt and Good (1993); Martines-Filho
(1996), and Good, Irwin, Jackson, and Price (1997).  When viewed as a group, these
studies hint that market advisory services may be able to enhance income relative to the
returns obtained from selling at harvest.  Robustness of the results is limited by extremely
small samples and by the considerable variance in performance by advisory service and
crop.  Nevertheless, the early evidence indicates that additional investigation is warranted.
In summary, the available evidence on individual-generated forecasts is largely
consistent with an efficient market at least in the Grossman and Stiglitz’s sense.  This
finding should not come as a surprise.  According to Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks
(1991), market efficiency is expected when investors play for significant stakes, investors
have sustained opportunities for practice, economic selection eliminates non-rational
traders, and poaching (i.e., arbitrage) opportunities can be seized readily.  These
characteristics describe futures and options markets, where entry is easy, trading
opportunities exist daily, loses are visible daily, and loses are magnified through the
leverage provided by margin money.
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Marketing Strategies Based on Market-Generated Forecasts of Production Profits
The discussion in the previous section leads to the conclusion that the only
individuals who can beat the market are those with superior access to information and/or
those who possess superior analytical ability.  However, we contend that the marketing
situation in competitive markets may not be this bleak for the average farmer.  A fourth
category of marketing strategies exists which we think offers marketing opportunities to
most producers.  These marketing strategies use the currently-quoted futures and options
prices to forecast the expected profit from engaging in a production activity.  The expected
profit is used to determine a production and associated hedging (i.e., marketing) strategy. 
This category of strategies is derived from viewing the futures and options prices as
forecasts which carry signals regarding production activities the market wants to encourage
or discourage.  Stated alternatively, these strategies are derived from using the collective
wisdom of the market to guide activities, rather than trying to increase price by
outguessing the market’s wisdom.  We illustrate these strategies by discussing two of
them:  storage arbitrage and farm production response strategies.
Storage strategies were first discussed by Working (1953).  In particular, he argued
that the current futures-cash basis provides a market determined estimate of the expected
return to storage.  Working discussed this strategy in the context of storage at the futures
market delivery point.  This allowed him to use the convergence of futures and cash
markets during the futures delivery month, i.e., the basis becomes nearly zero.  His
storage strategy was to store until the delivery month only when the current futures-cash
basis exceeds the cost of storing to the delivery month.  Working also advocated the use of
a hedge to assure that the expected storage return was earned.
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At non-delivery points or during non-delivery months, the storage agent can no
longer rely on convergence to provide a near-certain expectation of the basis at the end of
the storage period (i.e, zero).  Hence, uncertainty is introduced into storage returns.  One
technique for estimating the expected basis at the end of the desired storage period is to use
an average of past bases on the expected storage ending date.  Working’s basis strategy is
then transformed into: store only when the current basis minus the historical average basis
on the projected sell date exceeds the cost of storage15. 
To examine Working’s basis strategy over a long period of time at a non-delivery
point, we evaluated the returns to corn storage in Ohio over the 1964-1996 crop years. 
The parameters of the analysis were the same as those described above for the time of
harvest analysis16.   Figure 7 contains the net returns for unhedged storage of corn
harvested at the 50% harvest completion date separated out by basis storage signal: i.e.,
store or not store. The net returns to these two different signals do not differ statistically
from each other at the five percent test level.  The same result was found for corn
harvested at the 10% and 90% harvest completion date.  In short, Working’s basis strategy
offered little discernible ability to enhance returns to unhedged storage.
This result is not surprising because returns to unhedged storage are generated by
changes in cash prices.  In contrast, the basis measures the difference between cash and
futures prices.  Hence, the information it contains relates to changes in the difference
between cash and futures prices, not changes in cash prices.
The returns presented in Figure 8 for hedged storage stand in sharp contrast to the
returns presented in Figure 7 for unhedged storage.   For hedged storage at the 50%
completion date, average net returns were twice as large for years in which Working’s
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basis strategy indicated that corn should be stored than for the years in which the basis
strategy indicated that corn should not be stored.  Furthermore, the strategy was
statistically able at the five percent test level to discriminate among which years to store. 
The same general statistical relationship was found for the 10% and 90% harvest
completion dates.  Using shorter periods of analysis, Heifner (1966) and Tomek (1987)
also found that the basis strategy increased returns to hedged storage.
Compared with storage arbitrage strategies, the evidence regarding farm production
response hedging is less definitive.  The farm production response hedging strategy
involves placing a hedge in output and/or input futures whenever the expected profit from
production based on expected expenses and current futures prices (adjusted via the basis to
local conditions) exceed some specified level.  In essence, the market is signaling farmers
to increase production.  Hedging is a way to lock in this expected profit.  It is analogous to
locking in a storage return through hedging.  The existence of a farm production response
incentive is controversial because rational expectation theory suggests that the market
should incorporate expected producer response to current prices.  Thus, given rational
expectations, this incentive should not exist.
As a group, studies of farm production response hedging have found that this
market forecast based strategy may enhance returns and/or reduce risk, although it is
important to emphasize that it is not uncommon for studies to find that the strategy does
not increase income or reduce risk.  This literature is summarized in Johnson, Zulauf,
Irwin, and Gerlow (1991).
The existing farm production response hedging studies were conducted using
extremely small samples and did not use appropriate statistical techniques.  In a recent
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study, Irwin, Zulauf, and Jackson (1996) found no statistically significant evidence of
mean reversion in agricultural futures prices when appropriate statistical techniques were
used.  Mean reversion is probably a needed attribute of price behavior for profit-margin
hedging to be a successful strategy17. Nevertheless, the existing literature regarding farm
production response hedging suggests the need for further research using appropriate
statistical techniques.  If such a hedging strategy is found to enhance income (or reduce
risk), it would be a valuable tool for field crop producers who no longer have acreage
decisions dictated by government programs.
 CONCLUSIONS  AND  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  FARMER  MARKETING  STRATEGIES
The available evidence regarding returns to routine strategies using crop futures and
options is generally pessimistic.  In particular, there is no evidence that a routine drought
premium exists in pre-harvest quotes of new crop futures.  The available evidence
regarding returns to systematic strategies is mixed at best and the performance of
systematic strategies appear to vary by crop.  These conclusion are of seminal importance
because routine and systematic strategies can be used by anybody.  In contrast, there is
evidence that individuals can beat the market, although the number who can consistently do
so is small.  The primary attributes of these individuals are that they have superior access
to information and/or possess superior analytical ability.  These conclusions are consistent
with Grossman and Stiglitz’s model of market efficiency.  Hence, for most field crop
producers marketing strategies have limited ability to enhance income.  In a sense, this
conclusion reaffirms the “no-free-lunch” rule.
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On its surface the preceding paragraph seems to drip with pessimism, but we
suggest that in fact in contains a powerful directive for producers: a Grossman and
Stiglitz’s world of market efficiency underscores the importance of cost of production
relative to marketing when it comes to long term survival in a commodity market.  With
few exceptions, the field crop producers who survive will be those who have the lowest
cost of production since efforts to improve revenue through better marketing of the
commodity produced will meet with limited success over time.  Producers will increase
their probability of long-term survival by using their scarce resources to first maximize
their production efficiency before chasing the allure of marketing profits.  In other words,
a good marketing program starts with a good program for managing and controlling cost of
production.  This axiom needs to be incorporated into every marketing program.
Furthermore, we suggest that all is not lost for individual producers when it comes
to enhancing income through prudent marketing.  One example is to base storage decisions
on when a producer harvests the crop relative to the national harvest of the crop.  Stated
more broadly, an effective marketing program begins with first learning and practicing
effective cash marketing.  Another example is to base storage decisions on whether the
current basis exceeds the cost of storage, and then to use hedging to assure an expected
positive return.  This strategy involves using futures markets as an information input. 
Stated more broadly, producers need to begin using futures and option markets as a source
of marketing information, rather than just as a pricing and trading medium.
We end by noting the rather poor performance of econometric and other economic
models in predicting future prices.  This is not to say that such models are useless.  In a
world where information is costly, learning is not instantaneous, and the economic system
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is in a constant state of change; economic model building is likely to be an important part
of improving our understanding of the economic world.  The value of economic model
building is not in forecasting prices better than the futures markets, but in helping us
understand market parameters and in devising less costly means to analyze and collect
information.
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ENDNOTES
1. Fama (1970) referred to the definition used here as strong-form efficient in his 1970
article and as tests for private information in his 1991 update article.
2. For an excellent discussion of the impacts and controversies surrounding the Efficient
Market Theory in the context of the stock market see Ball (1996). 
3. While the random walk price process is a useful pedagogical tool, the martingale
price process has supplanted it within the efficient market literature.  An excellent
discussion of the efficient market theory and its relationship to the random walk and
martingale price processes is provided by LeRoy (1989).  Both the martingale and
random walk imply that, given the information set available at time t, the best guess
of price at time t+1 is the price at time t and that the expected change in price is
zero.  The difference between the two price processes is that a martingale rules out a
relationship between the expected mean price change and the information set available
at time t, whereas the random walk rules out this relationship and any other
relationship involving higher conditional moments of price changes and the
information set at time t.
4.  See Brorsen and Irwin (1996) for a more thorough discussion of Grossman and
Stiglitz’s model of noisy rational expectations and its relationship to Fama’s model,
which is similar to Muth’s rational expectation model (1961).
5.  It is worth emphasizing that this discussion of marketing strategies occurs within the
context of a competitive market with homogenous products.  In a market with
differentiated products, a different and more diverse set of marketing strategies are
available.  These strategies are categorized in various ways.  One typology is
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strategies involving product positioning, price, distribution, and promotion (Bovee,
Houston, and Thill, 1995).
6.  Transaction costs include brokerage fees and liquidity costs.  Currently, brokerage
fees for a 5,000 bushel corn and soybean contract are commonly cited as $50 for a
round-trip futures trade and $30 per single option trade (Good, Irwin, Jackson, and
Price, 1997).  Liquidity costs are payments earned by floor traders (scalpers) for
filling an order to sell at the market.  They have been estimated to be one price tick
(1/4 cent per bushel for grain futures and 1/8 cent per bushel for grain options) for
the more heavily traded nearby contracts and two price ticks for the more lightly
traded contracts that are more than 5 months from delivery (Brorsen and Nielsen,
1986, and Thompson and Waller, 1987).  Summing these two components,
transaction costs are at least $75 for a round-trip futures trade and $36.25 for a single
option trade.
7.  If futures are used for pre-harvest selling, cash flow requirements may become
significant due to margin calls resulting from adverse price moves (Larson,
Alexander, Zulauf, and Irwin, 1997).  When purchasing put options, a known
premium must be paid at the time of purchase; however, the buyer is not exposed to
additional cash flow requirements due to adverse price moves.
8. Among the other agricultural commodities examined, Kolb found strong evidence of
normal backwardation in feeder cattle, live cattle, live hogs, and frozen concentrated
orange juice futures contracts.  Some evidence in support of normal backwardation
was found for soy oil and soy meal futures contracts.
9. For a complete discussion of the procedures, see Leeds, Zulauf, and Irwin (1992b).
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10. Bessembinder (1992) also investigated live cattle, world sugar, and a portfolio of the
five agricultural commodities.  Trading returns on futures were significant only when
hedgers were net short for the portfolio.  Returns averaged 11 percent expressed on
an annual basis.
11. Bessembinder and Chan (1992) also investigated live cattle.  A significant
relationship was found between trading returns on live cattle futures and both the
three-month Treasury bill yield and the dividend yield on the equity index.  They also
found that the macro-economic variables possessed statistically significant power to
predict futures trading returns when the four agricultural commodities were evaluated
as a group.
12. There is considerable disagreement about whether these pricing anomalies generate
trading returns which are consistent with a time-varying risk premium or whether
they generate abnormal trading returns (i.e., they are price anomalies).
13. Irwin, Krukemyer, and Zulauf (1993) found that, after adjusting for costs and risk,
public commodity pools do not earn abnormal profits despite their large and
significant gross trading returns.
14. Fama (1991) reached the same conclusion with respect to the literature on private
information in the stock market, i.e., private information exists which generates
abnormal trading returns.  An example is information possessed by corporate
insiders.
15. For a more detailed discussion of basis forecast procedures see Tomek (1997).
16. For a complete discussion of the calculation procedures, see Leeds, Zulauf, and Irwin
(1992a).
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17. This observation is based on the argument that over time prices should equal the cost
of production in a competitive market.  If the output price offers a profit for
production and producers respond to this profit, then price will decline toward the
cost of production as production expands.  The reverse should happen if output price
signals a loss.  Hence, price reverts to the cost of production, or its mean value in a
competitive market.
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TABLE 1.  Price of Harvest Futures at Selected Times before Harvest Minus Harvest-time
Price of Harvest Futures, December Corn and November Soybean Futures, 1952 -1996.
Average Price Price Difference by Date Before Harvest
Year
 of  Harvest
Futures at
Harvest a
September 1 July 1 May 1 March 1
Corn (¢/bushel) b
1952 - 1996 197 1.19
(0.37)
7.21
(1.21)
2.65
(0.44)
2.79
(0.47)
1952 - 1973 133 -0.47
(-0.31)
0.28
(0.08)
-2.07
(-0.42)
-2.35
(-0.40)
1974 - 1996 259 2.78
(0.44)
13.83
(1.25)
7.16
(0.65)
7.72
(0.76)
1952 - 1962 127 2.34
(1.55)
3.91
(1.47)
4.95
(1.96)
5.18
  (2.49*)
1963 - 1973 138 -3.28
(-1.34)
-3.34
(-0.50)
-9.09
(-0.97)
-9.88
(-0.86)
1974 - 1984 280 4.89
(0.61)
2.05
(0.12)
1.11
(0.06)
4.02
(0.24)
1985 - 1996 239 0.85
(0.09)
24.63
(1.79)
12.71
(1.12)
11.10
(0.90)
Soybeans (¢/bushel)
1952 - 1996 458 5.07
(0.73)
9.66
(0.83)
-2.13
(-0.15)
-5.40
(-0.41)
1952 - 1973 277 0.84
(0.12)
2.95
(0.54)
-13.36
  (-2.59*)
-13.34
(-1.81)
1974 - 1996 632 9.12
(0.77)
16.09
(0.72)
8.62
(0.32)
2.20
(0.09)
1952 - 1962 246 -5.17
(-1.41)
3.11
(0.45)
-4.66
(-0.90)
-0.65
(-0.10)
1963 - 1973 307 6.85
(0.49)
2.79
(0.32)
-22.06
  (-2.64*)
-26.02
(-2.09)
1974 - 1984 675 -2.39
(-0.13)
-19.30
(-0.50)
-25.11
(-0.49)
-19.30
(-0.43)
1985 - 1996 592 19.67
(1.25)
48.52
(2.28*)
39.54
(1.91)
21.90
(0.89)
a Harvest is defined as November 1 for soybeans and December 1 for corn.
b The t-test is reported in the parenthesis for  the null  hypothesis:  Price of Harvest Futures before Harvest
Minus Price of Harvest Futures at Harvest = 0.    * - indicates significance at 5 percent test level using a
two-tailed test.
SOURCE:  original calculations
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TABLE 2.  Average Return to Selling Put Options at Selected Times before Harvest a,
Corn and Soybean September and Harvest Futures Options, 1985 - 1996.
Return to Selling Put Option by Date Before Harvest    b
Year September 1 July 1 May 1 March 1
Corn September Option ( ¢/bushel)
1985 - 1996 NA 9.98
  (2.66*)
7.67
(1.40)
9.01
(1.22)
1990 - 1996  NA 8.25
(1.27)
1.70
(0.22)
4.64
(0.45)
Corn December Option ( ¢/bushel)
1985 - 1996 2.32
(0.49)
12.78
(1.51)
8.00
(1.39)
8.08
(1.45)
1990 - 1996 5.70
(0.78)
16.09
(1.23)
10.41
(1.19)
11.11
(1.35)
Soybean September Option ( ¢/bushel)
1985 - 1996  NA 7.26
(0.88)
10.31
(0.89)
   8.52 c
(0.64)
1990 - 1996  NA -0.10
(-0.10)
-0.45
(-0.04)
1.66
(0.11)
Soybean November Option ( ¢/bushel)
1985 - 1996 9.68
(1.21)
15.79
(1.26)
18.29
(1.29)
20.47
(1.40)
1990 - 1996 10.71
(0.87)
4.45
(0.32)
11.45
(0.90)
14.34
(0.95)
NA - not applicable
a The put option position is closed on the 15th day of the month before the delivery month
of the futures contract or the last day of trading, whichever came first.
b The t-test is reported in the parenthesis for the null hypothesis: return to option position
=  0.   * - indicates significance at 5 percent test level using a two-tailed test.
c The soybean September option price was not available for March 1, 1985.
SOURCE:  original calculations
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TABLE 3.  Average Return to Various Marketing Strategies, 21 Illinois Farms, Corn
and Soybeans, 1985 -1995.
Corn Soybeans
Strategy Mean t-statistic a Mean t-statistic a
Gross Production Returns  b  ($/acre)
Sell at Harvest 303 NA 251 NA
Sell Futures on May 1  c 319 0.82 266 1.56
Buy Sept. Put on May 1  d 319 2.04 260 1.30
Buy Harvest Put on May 1  c 310 0.93 259 0.97
Gross Trading Returns to Futures or Option Position   (    ¢/ bushel)
Sell Futures on May 1  c 11.0 0.90 33.8 1.66
Buy Sept. Put on May 1  d 10.6 2.07 15.4 1.35
Buy Harvest Put on May 1  c 4.9 0.85 14.6 1.02
a The t-statistic for gross production returns per acre is for the null hypothesis:  gross
returns with pre-harvest strategy - gross returns from selling at harvest = 0.  The t-
statistic for gross trading returns is for the null hypothesis:  gross trading return = 0.
b Gross return for selling at harvest equals cash price during the week in which 50 percent
of the Illinois crop is harvested times the farm’s yield.  Gross return for the other
marketing strategies includes the return from selling futures or buying the put.  It is
assumed that 100 percent of expected production (five-year moving average of yield
minus high and low yield) is sold before harvest.
c Futures and harvest put positions are closed out on the same date the cash sale is made,
i.e. the week in which 50 percent of the Illinois crop is harvested.
d September put option position is closed on the 15th day of August or the last day of
trading, whichever came first.
SOURCE:  original calculations
40
TABLE 4.  Gross Trading Returns Earned by Traders Grouped According to
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Data on Position of Large Traders, Selected
Commodities, 1977-1981.
Gross Trading Returns (Million $)
Commodity
Large
Hedger
Large
Speculator
Small
Trader
Oats     9.63     0.64   -10.28
Wheat a   66.73   13.53   -80.30
Pork Bellies   79.05     1.48   -80.56
Live Cattle -130.27 197.12   -66.85
Feeder Cattle   29.13   75.42 -104.55
T-bonds 559.09 -169.07 -390.02
T-bills 114.96     5.48 -120.44
    TOTAL 728.00 125.00 -853.00
a  This includes the Chicago, Kansas City, and Minneapolis wheat futures markets.
SOURCE:  Hartzmark, pages 1298-1299.
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Figure 1.  Observed Probability of a Price Increase and Decline
Between May 1 and November 1 on November Soybean Contract
and May 1 and December 1 on December Corn Contract, 1974-96
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Figure 2.  Average Price Increase and Average Price Decline
Between May 1 and November 1 on November Soybean Contract
and May 1 and December 1 on December Corn Contract, 1974-96
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Figure 3. Net Return to Unhedged
Storage by Time of Harvest
and Week Sold After Harvest,
Ohio Corn, 1964-1996 Crop Years
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Figure 4. Net Return to Hedged
Storage by Time of Harvest
and Week Sold After Harvest,
Ohio Corn, 1964-1996 Crop Years
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Figure 5. Return Risk of Unhedged
Storage by Time of Harvest
and Week Sold After Harvest,
Ohio Corn, 1964-1996 Crop Years
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Figure 6. Return Risk of Hedged
Storage by Time of Harvest
and Week Sold After Harvest,
Ohio Corn, 1964-1996 Crop Years
Figure 8. Net Return to Hedged
Storage by Basis Storage Signal and
Week Sold After Harvest, 50% Harvest,
Ohio Corn, 1967-1996 Crop Years
Figure 7. Net Return to Unhedged
Storage by Basis Storage Signal and
Week Sold After Harvest, 50% Harvest,
 Ohio Corn, 1967-1996 Crop Years
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